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TYSON FOODS, INC. V. 
BOUAPHAKEO: THE USE OF 
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN CLASS 
ACTIONS 
WENBO ZHANG* 
INTRODUCTION 
Statistical methods have always played an important role in 
litigation.1 The importance of statistical analysis is particularly 
apparent in class-action lawsuits because the aggregation of individual 
claims allows more data collection and information gathering.2 
Crippling the use of statistical evidence in litigation could have wide 
implications in various legal contexts, including calculating damages 
in wrongful death cases, using DNA evidence in criminal prosecutions, 
and determining liability in pharmaceutical products, antitrust, and 
discrimination cases.3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has largely 
foreclosed arguments for trial by statistics in Wal-Mart Stores v. 
Dukes.4 
The Court’s decision in Dukes does not, and should not, however, 
indicate the demise of statistical sampling in class-action lawsuits. 
Many courts have expressed their support for the use of statistics in 
class action cases post-Dukes.5 In particular, most courts have refused 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2017. 
 1.  Robert G. Bone, A Normative Evaluation of Actuarial Litigation, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 
227, 228 (2012); Brief of Economists and Other Social Scientists As Amici Curiae In Support of 
Respondents at 8, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2015). 
 2.  Id. at 9–10. 
 3.  Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors In Support of Respondents at 10–11, 
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2015). 
 4.  131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (rejecting plaintiffs’ method of proving class-wide sex 
discrimination by relying on an extrapolation of results from a sample of the class). 
 5.  See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1257 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(observing that Dukes “does not prohibit certification based on the use of extrapolation to 
calculate damages”); Balasanyan v. Nordstrom, Inc., 294 F.R.D. 550, 572 (S.D. Cal. 2013) 
(permitting the use of a survey to establish damages after Dukes); Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., No. 
ED CV 11-1600 PSG (SPx), 2013 WL 146323, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2013) (finding Dukes 
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to adopt much of the rationale of Dukes in cases under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),6 and wage-and-hour cases where 
company-wide compensation policies, rather than the subjective 
intent of managers, are scrutinized.7 Importantly, in cases where the 
employer violates its timekeeping duty under the FLSA, the long-
standing rule of Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.8 preserves the 
employees’ right to use inferential evidence based on relevant 
statistics to establish class-wide proof. 
It follows that Mt. Clemens, rather than Dukes, should be the 
controlling precedent for Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo.9 In Tyson 
Foods, employees of one of Tyson’s meat-processing facilities sued 
their employer for failure to pay overtime compensation required 
under both federal and state labor law. And like the employer in Mt. 
Clemens, Tyson violated (for purposes of class certification) the FLSA 
recordkeeping requirements, which mandate that the employer keep 
accurate records of the employees’ working hours. The Supreme 
Court is asked to address the important issue of whether certification 
was proper where plaintiffs used representative evidence to prove the 
amount of work they did, in accordance with Mt. Clemens.10  
This commentary first describes the factual and legal backgrounds 
of Tyson Foods in Parts I and II respectively, and then explains the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in Bouaphakeo v. Tyson 
 
to be inapplicable when the calculation of wage-and-hour penalties did not require 
individualized determinations). 
 6.  29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 7.  See, e.g., Morris v. Affinity Health Plan, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
Smith v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 09-cv-01632-CMA-BNB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56987, at *15 (D. 
Colo. Apr. 21, 2012); Robinson v. Ryla Teleserv., Inc., No. CA 11-131-KD-C, 2011 WL 6667338, 
at *3–4 (S.D. Ala., Dec. 21, 2011); Gilmer v. Alameda-Contra Costa Dist., No. C 08-05186, 2011 
WL 5242977 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011); Ware v. TMobile USA, No. 3:11-cv-411, 2011 WL 
5244396, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2011); Troy v. Kehe Food Distrib., Inc., No. C09-0785JLR, 
2011 WL 4480172, *14 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 26, 2011); Faust v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt., 
No. WMN-10-2336, 2011 WL 5244421, at *1 n.1. (D. Md. Nov. 1, 2011); Sliger v. Prospect Mort., 
No. Civ. S-11-465 LKK/EFB, 2011 WL 3747947, at *2 n.25 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011). But see 
Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n., Nos. A125557 & A126827, 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 107 (Cal. 
App. Feb. 6, 2012), modified and reh’g denied, Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 2012 Cal. App. 
LEXIS 265 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Mar. 6, 2012). 
 8.  328 U.S. 680 (1946). 
 9.  No. 14-1146 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2015). 
 10.  See Brief of Petitioner at i, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo No. 14-1146 (U.S. Aug. 7, 
2015) [hereinafter Brief of Petitioner]. The Court has also been asked to address a second issue: 
whether certification was proper when some class members may not have been injured. See id. 
This Commentary, however, focuses only on the issue of the use of representative evidence. 
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Foods, Inc.11 in Part III. Part IV presents both parties’ arguments. 
Finally, Part V examines the validity of the plaintiffs’ use of statistical 
evidence to estimate class-wide liability and damages, and argues that 
the Supreme Court should allow the plaintiffs to use this type of 
representative evidence to support class certification. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Tyson operates a pork-processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa.12 
The facility requires all employees to wear certain items of personal 
protective equipment (PPE), which is stored in lockers at the facility.13 
Production employees are required to clean and put on the required 
PPE before they start working on the production line, and they 
generally do so in the locker rooms.14 Tyson pays its production 
employees on a “gang time” system, which only records the time 
workers spend at the production line when the production line is 
moving.15 
Besides “gang time,” Tyson also pays some of its employees for a 
few additional minutes per day—known as “K-code” time—to 
compensate them for donning, doffing, and washing specialized 
protective equipment.16 Prior to 2007, Tyson paid four minutes of K-
code time to each employee in a department where knives were 
used.17 From February 2007 to June 2010, Tyson limited K-code 
payment to only knife-wielding employees but raised the K-code time 
to between four and eight minutes per day, to account for both 
walking between the locker room and the production line, and 
donning and doffing.18 Tyson never recorded the actual amount of 
time workers spent donning, doffing, rinsing, or walking.19 
A group of current and former production employees at the 
Storm Lake facility filed suit against Tyson in 2007, alleging that the 
 
 11.  Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 
2806 (2015). 
 12.  Joint Appendix at 28, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (U.S. Aug. 7, 
2015) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]. 
 13.  Id. at 36. 
 14.  Id. at 37. 
 15.  Brief for Respondents at 7, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (U.S. Sept. 
22, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents]. 
 16.  Joint Appendix, supra note 12, at 186. 
 17.  Id. at 121–22. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 175. 
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company undercompensated them for their overtime donning and 
doffing work in violation of the FLSA and the Iowa Wage Payment 
Collection Law (“IWPCL”).20 The Northern District of Iowa certified 
a class action and conditionally certified a collective action based on 
Rule 23 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), respectively.21 In doing so, the court 
found that there were “far more factual similarities than 
dissimilarities” among the class and collective action members and 
that questions common to the class predominated over individualized 
questions.22 A total of 444 employees joined the collective action; the 
parallel class action had 3,344 plaintiffs.23 
In the ensuing jury trial, the plaintiffs presented employee 
testimony, video recordings of donning and doffing at the facility, and 
an expert-run study based on 744 videotaped observations.24 In the 
study, the expert estimated that donning, doffing, and related activities 
required 21.25 minutes per day for employees in the slaughter 
department and 18 minutes per day for employees in the processing 
department.25 From these estimates, another expert calculated the 
amount of uncompensated overtime for each individual plaintiff and 
tallied a total of approximately $6.7 million in unpaid overtime for the 
entire class.26 At Tyson’s request, the jury instructions stated, “any 
employee who has already received full compensation for all activities 
you may find to be compensable is not entitled to recover any 
damages.”27 The court also heeded Tyson’s proposed verdict form 
calling for the jury to provide a single total damages award.28 
The jury found that the time the employees spent donning and 
doffing their PPE was compensable work “integral and indispensible” 
to the employees’ gang-time work and not “de minimis,” but that 
donning and doffing during meal breaks was not compensable.29 It 
 
 20.  Id. at 28, 39–40. 
 21.  Id. at 117. 
 22.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25, Tyson 
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Brief for the United 
States]. 
 23.  Joint Appendix, supra note 12, at 117. 
 24.  Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 
S. Ct. 2806 (2015). 
 25.  Joint Appendix, supra note 12, at 123–24. 
 26.  Id. at 139, 465–66. 
 27.  Id. at 101. 
 28.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 20. 
 29.  Joint Appendix, supra note 12, at 486–87. 
ZHANG FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2016  12:16 PM 
2016] THE USE OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IN CLASS ACTIONS 137 
awarded roughly $2.9 million in damages to the plaintiffs.30 Tyson 
appealed and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.31 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a 
damages class action which satisfies Rule 23(a)’s requirements may be 
certified if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common 
to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”32 
The FLSA establishes both a minimum wage requirement and an 
overtime compensation requirement at a rate of one and one-half 
times an employee’s regular wage for work exceeding forty hours in a 
workweek.33 It allows “any one or more employees” to bring a 
“collective action” to recover unpaid wages “for and on behalf of 
himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated.”34 
For FLSA collective action certifications, most jurisdictions have 
adopted a two-step approach in determining whether plaintiffs are 
“similarly situated.”35 For conditional certification at the initial “notice 
stage,” the “similarly situated” requirement is met when there are 
“substantial allegations that the putative class members were together 
the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.”36 If conditional 
certification is granted, prospective class members can then opt into 
the lawsuit.37 At the second step of certification, courts review the 
“similarly situated” question again using a stricter standard.38 Factors 
courts consider include “(1) disparate factual and employment 
settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available 
to defendant which appear to be individual to each plaintiff; [and] (3) 
 
 30.  Id. at 488. 
 31.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 22. 
 32.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 33.  29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Daniel C. Lopez, Collective Confusion: FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class 
Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 288 (2009); see Thiessen v. Gen. 
Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 36.  Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Vaszlavik v. Storage Tech. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 672, 
678 (D. Colo. 1997)). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 1103. 
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fairness and procedural considerations.”39 Once the collective action 
proceeds to trial, the opt-in class members enjoy the same rights, 
privileges, and benefits as the original plaintiff.40 
FLSA collective actions are “fundamentally different” from class 
actions under Rule 23(b).41 First, the majority of the United States 
appellate courts believe that the FLSA “similarly situated” 
requirement is less stringent than Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement.42 Second, unlike Rule 23(b)(3), which requires class 
members to opt out if they do not wish to be included in a class, 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA requires employees to opt into the 
lawsuit by filing written consent to become “party plaintiff[s].”43 The 
purpose of § 216(b) is to allow employees with common issues of law 
and fact arising from the same violation to sue collectively, so as to 
reduce individual costs and boost efficiency in the judicial system.44 
Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act of 194745 to exclude some 
of the activities that constitute work under the FLSA, such as 
travelling to and from the location of the employee’s principal 
activity, and activities that are “preliminary to or postliminary to said 
principal activity.”46 The exceptions to such exclusions only apply to 
those activities that are considered an “integral and indispensable 
part of the principal activities” and are performed before the 
commencement of an employee’s principal activities on any particular 
workday.47 Such activities are compensable even when they are 
performed “before or after the regular work shift, on or off the 
production line.”48 
The FLSA also requires employers to keep “records of the 
persons employed . . . and of the wages, hours, and other conditions 
and practices of employment” according to regulations the Secretary 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2013). 
 42.  7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1807 
(3d ed. Supp. 2015); see, e.g., O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 585–86 (6th 
Cir. 2009); Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 n.12 (11th Cir. 1996). But see 
Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, 705 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 43.  29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
 44.  See Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989). 
 45.  29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012). 
 46.  IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 26–28 (2005). 
 47.  29 U.S.C. § 254(a). 
 48.  Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 29–30 (quoting Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956)). 
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of Labor issued,49 including “[h]ours worked each workday[,] . . .  total 
hours worked each workweek,” and regular and overtime pay.50 
The Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL)51 is a 
complementary wage-and-hour law paralleling the FLSA. It requires 
employers to pay for all hours worked and to compensate for 
overtime work.52 Like the FLSA, the IWPCL requires recordkeeping53 
and creates a private cause of action.54 
In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., the Supreme Court 
addressed the problem that arises when “the employer’s records are 
inaccurate or inadequate.”55 In that case, seven employees and their 
labor union, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, 
brought a FLSA collective-action suit alleging that the employer’s 
method of computing the total working time did not accurately reflect 
the time they actually worked and that they were deprived of the 
proper amount of overtime compensation.56 The Court rejected the 
Sixth Circuit’s stringent standard of proof and held that the 
employer’s “failure to keep proper records in conformity with [its] 
statutory duty” calls for a burden-shifting framework that prevents 
the employer from benefiting from its own mistake.57 
Under this framework, an employee first has to show that “he has 
in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated” 
and that he has “sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of 
that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.”58 Then, the 
burden shifts to the employer to provide evidence of the exact 
amount of work performed or evidence to undermine the employee’s 
evidence.59 Because the employer has received the benefits of the 
employee’s work, even if the lack of accurate records was a bona fide 
mistake, the employer still has to pay for the work “on the most 
accurate basis possible under the circumstances.”60 
 
 49.  29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2012). 
 50.  29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a)(6)–(9) (2015). 
 51.  IOWA CODE § 91A.1–A.14 (2015). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 875-216.2(1)(g) (2015). 
 54.  IOWA CODE § 91A.8. 
 55.  Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946). 
 56.  Id. at 684. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 687–88. 
 60.  Id. 
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In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, approximately 1.5 million current and 
former female Wal-Mart employees filed a class-action lawsuit against 
their employer, alleging systematic sex discrimination in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.61 The Supreme Court ruled 
that Rule 23(a)(2)’s requirement of commonality was not satisfied 
and reversed class certification.62 The Court refused to allow the 
plaintiffs to prove sex discrimination and the amount of backpay 
owed by the method they proposed.63 This method involves first 
determining the number of valid claims for a sample of the class, then 
applying the percentage of valid claims to the entire class, and finally 
multiplying that number “by the average backpay award in the 
sample set to arrive at the entire class recovery.”64 This kind of “[t]rial 
by [f]ormula,” the Court unanimously held, would violate the Rules 
Enabling Act65 by depriving Wal-Mart of the right to litigate its 
statutory defense to individual claims.66 
III.  HOLDING 
In Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to certify the class.67 
Like the district court, the court of appeals found that the differences 
in the equipment worn by employees were inconsequential.68 The 
court observed that because Tyson violated its statutory 
recordkeeping obligations, Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. 
allowed the plaintiffs to use representative proof to determine the 
amount of individual unrecorded overtime.69 Moreover, the court 
factually distinguished Wal-Mart v. Dukes and observed that the 
present case did not present a “trial by formula” as suggested by 
Tyson because the plaintiffs “prove[d] liability for the class as a whole, 
using employee time records to establish individual damages.”70 The 
court also reasoned that a class might be certified even if some class 
members’ claims failed on the merits and therefore they could not 
 
 61.  Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2544 (2011). 
 62.  Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2544–46. 
 63.  Id. at 2561. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
 66.  Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. 
 67.  See Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 800 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 68.  See id. at 797. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 797–98. 
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actually recover.71 The court pointed out that the jury instructions 
ensured that the presence of such class members did not affect the 
size of the verdict.72 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A.  Tyson’s Arguments 
Tyson argues that the employees composing the putative class 
were not “similarly situated” and that questions of law or fact 
common to the class did not predominate over individual questions.73 
Because the class members wear different combinations of personal 
protective equipment that take varying amounts of time to don, doff, 
and rinse, Tyson argues that it is impossible for plaintiffs to show, with 
common evidence, that they have collectively worked more than forty 
hours without receiving overtime compensation.74 Not only do 
individual questions predominate, according to Tyson, the lower 
courts also erred in allowing statistical sampling to demonstrate 
plaintiffs’ class-wide liability and damages.75 Tyson vigorously attacks 
plaintiffs’ use of the average donning/doffing times, emphasizing that 
“[n]o court would allow an individual employee to prove that he 
worked unpaid overtime by submitting evidence of the amount of 
time worked by other employees who did different activities that took 
a different amount of time to perform.”76 
Tyson interprets the Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Mt. 
Clemens Pottery Co. to hold “only that an employee carried his 
burden of proving entitlement to damages under the FLSA ‘if he 
proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was 
improperly compensated and if he produces sufficient evidence to 
show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and 
reasonable inference.’”77 In other words, Tyson argues that Mt. 
Clemens is relevant only after an employee has demonstrated by 
individualized evidence that he performed uncompensated overtime 
work. Therefore, the case should not be read to allow plaintiffs’ use of 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 18. 
 74.  Id. at 19. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 19–20 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery 
Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687). 
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statistical evidence to estimate the amount of injury the class 
collectively suffered. 
Tyson raises the inclusion of hundreds of uninjured class members 
in the class as another independent ground for reversing the decision 
below because such inclusion deprives the class of Article III 
standing.78 Tyson introduces a new test to determine if plaintiffs have 
constitutional and statutory standing: plaintiffs must show “(1) that 
they can prove with common evidence that all class members were 
injured, or (2) that there is a mechanism for identifying the uninjured 
class members and ensuring that they do not contribute to the size of 
the damages award and cannot recover damages.”79 If plaintiffs fail to 
meet either requirement prior to certification, Tyson argues, common 
issues cannot predominate and the class cannot be certified.80 Even 
after the class is certified, Tyson suggests, the court may reconsider the 
certification decision “if it later appears that plaintiffs’ proof is 
insufficient to establish classwide injury or the culling mechanism is 
unworkable or inadequate.”81 
B.  Bouaphakeo’s Arguments 
Bouaphakeo and the rest of the class rely heavily on the Supreme 
Court’s Mt. Clemens ruling to support a conclusion that common 
questions predominate.82 First, the class identifies four common 
contentions about whether their work was compensable under federal 
and state wage-and-hour laws and argues that Tyson conceded that 
those issues would “dominate” the litigation.83 Second, four of the five 
questions on the verdict form were compensability issues that are 
common to the class.84 Thus, the workers argue that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in finding that issues regarding the 
compensability of their work predominated.85 They argue that the 
only issue that is individualized—the actual number of hours the class 
members spent on compensable activities—would have been easy to 
 
 78.  See id. at 20. 
 79.  Id. at 21. 
 80.  See id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See Brief for Respondents, supra note 14, at 22. 
 83.  Id. at 23. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  See id. 
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resolve had Tyson kept proper records of those hours as required by 
both the FLSA and Iowa law.86 
Per Mt. Clemens, the workers argue that Tyson’s failure to fulfill 
its statutory recordkeeping duties permits them to “demonstrate the 
‘appropriate’ time worked ‘as a matter of just and reasonable 
inference.’”87 The class rejects Tyson’s argument that the Mt. Clemens 
rule is limited to determining the amount of damages.88 Rather, “Mt. 
Clemens’ core holding,” according to the class, is that “where the 
defendant has deprived workers of accurate records . . . [w]orkers may 
satisfy their evidentiary burden through reasonable approximation 
under an objective, classwide standard.”89 Furthermore, the class 
points out that the Mt. Clemens evidentiary standard is a substantive 
rule and therefore the district court, by applying the rule to justify 
certification, did not violate the Rules Enabling Act and the Due 
Process Clause as Tyson claims.90 
The class factually distinguishes this case from Wal-Mart v. Dukes 
and argues that the statistical approach employed here is not the 
“trial by formula” that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in 
Dukes.91 While Dukes involved a myriad of discretionary decisions for 
which proof by statistical methods was inappropriate, the plaintiffs 
here are “subjected to a common, plant-wide policy that 
systematically undercompensated them.”92 
Lastly, the class argues that Tyson lacks standing to appeal the 
district court’s lump-sum damages award both because Tyson itself 
invited the error by insisting on an aggregated verdict and because 
the allocation of the verdict does not change Tyson’s liability.93 The 
jury instruction also ensured that uninjured class members would not 
receive any damages award.94 
 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  Id. at 24 (quoting Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946)). 
 88.  Id. at 24, 43–44. 
 89.  Id. at 39. 
 90.  Id. at 25. 
 91.  See id. at 25, 50. 
 92.  Id. at 50. 
 93.  Id. at 26, 57–58. 
 94.  Id. at 26, 59. 
ZHANG FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2016  12:16 PM 
144 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 11 
VI.  ANALYSIS: MT. CLEMENS GOVERNS THE SUBSTANTIVE 
EVIDENTIARY STANDARD 
Under Rule 23(b)(3) a class may be certified if common questions 
predominate over individual ones and a class action is superior to 
other methods of resolving a dispute.95 Because predominance 
requires the plaintiffs to establish “classwide proof,”96 whether this 
requirement is satisfied depends on the substantive law governing the 
plaintiffs’ claims.97 The FLSA collective action requirement is less 
stringent, as it only requires employees joining an action to be 
“similarly situated” and does not require common questions to 
predominate over individual ones.98 
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. allows employees to rely on 
inferences drawn from representative proof to “show the amount and 
extent” of their overtime work on a class-wide basis.99 In Tyson Foods, 
Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, Tyson’s violation of its recordkeeping duty under 
the FLSA triggers the evidentiary standard the Supreme Court 
established in Mt. Clemens. 
Despite its recent rejection of “trial by formula” in Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, the Court should allow the plaintiffs in Tyson Foods to use 
statistical evidence in light of Mt. Clemens. Because of Mt. Clemens’ 
clear precedential authority in this case, the Court should decide this 
case narrowly, without addressing the stringency of class certification 
requirements in general. 
This case requires the Court to decide between two conflicting 
interpretations of Mt. Clemens: whether it governs the determination 
of both liability and damages or whether it applies only when 
“damage is . . . certain” and the “uncertainty lies only in the amount of 
damages.”100 Because of the impracticality of proving liability and 
 
 95.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 96.  Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2013). 
 97.  See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) 
(“Considering whether ‘questions of law or fact common to class members predominate’ begins 
. . . with the elements of the underlying cause of action.”); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 
1426, 1432 (2013) (stating that the predominance inquiry “generally involves considerations that 
are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff ‘s cause of action”) (citation 
omitted). 
 98.  Scott A. Moss & Nantiya Ruan, The Second-Class Class Action: How Courts Thwart 
Wage Rights by Misapplying Class Action Rules, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 536 (2012); Brian R. 
Gates, A “Less Stringent” Standard? How to Give FLSA Section 16(b) A Life of Its Own, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1553 (2005). 
 99.  Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946). 
 100.  Id. at 688. 
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damages separately in this case, the Court should adopt the former 
reading of Mt. Clemens. 
The question, therefore, is what prerequisites must be met for the 
Mt. Clemens rule to apply. Tyson wants the plaintiffs to prove that 
individual class member’s work exceeds the forty-hour overtime 
threshold before representative evidence can be introduced to 
determine how much overtime the plaintiffs are owed.101 As the 
plaintiffs point out, however, “where the ‘liability’ question is simply 
whether an employee suffered any damages,” the distinction between 
liability and damages is “untenable.”102 Here, proving one will 
necessarily prove the other because the amount of uncompensated 
work the plaintiffs performed is the only fact governing both liability 
and damages.103 Therefore, it is nonsensical to require the plaintiffs to 
establish liability before they can use “just and reasonable inference” 
to establish the amount of damages. 
Additionally, such a requirement would defeat the central purpose 
of the Mt. Clemens decision, which is to relieve the employees of an 
unreasonable evidentiary burden when the employer fails to meet its 
recordkeeping duty.104 Hence, the reading of Mt. Clemens to both 
liability and damages most accurately captures the Court’s intent at 
the time. 
Because Mt. Clemens applies to this case, the plaintiffs’ use of 
statistical evidence is proper. Tyson argues that the use of statistical 
averages to estimate the liability and damages of the class constitutes 
“trial by formula,” which was explicitly rejected by the Court in 
Dukes.105 Tyson is both misinterpreting the term and baselessly 
stretching the application of Dukes. 
In Dukes, the Court used “trial by formula” to describe a process 
“where liability and damages would be determined for a sample of 
class members” and “[t]he percentage of claims determined to be 
valid would then be applied to the entire remaining class, and the 
number of (presumptively) valid claims thus derived would be 
multiplied by the average backpay award in the same set to arrive at 
the entire class recovery—without further individualized 
 
 101.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 39. 
 102.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 43. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687. 
 105.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 39. 
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proceedings.”106 Unlike in Dukes, however, where the plaintiffs only 
proved liability for a sample set of class members, the plaintiffs in this 
case proved liability for every class member by calculating the 
amount of time each member worked “[u]sing ‘time sheets’ and ‘[p]ay 
data’ obtained ‘directly from [Tyson].’”107 
Additionally, Dukes is factually dissimilar to this case, so it has 
little precedential value here.108 Unlike Dukes, which involved many 
discretionary decisions, this case involves employees working at the 
same plant, using similar equipment, and who are subjected to the 
same company policy that “systematically undercompensated them 
for compensable work under the FLSA and state law.”109 Hence, 
Tyson’s attempt to use the Dukes decision to undermine the Mt. 
Clemens rule here fails. 
Similarly, Tyson’s argument that variations in the time the 
plaintiffs spent donning and doffing the different equipment 
“rendered [their] evidence insufficient for the jury to draw a 
reasonable inference of the extent of class members’ uncompensated 
work” also fails.110 First, whether the differences among class members 
are so great as to warrant decertification is a factual inquiry for the 
jury to decide. Here, the jury returned a verdict for the class, which 
suggests that it found the class members to be sufficiently similar to 
permit reasonable inferences based on the plaintiffs’ representative 
evidence. Tyson cannot ask the Court to overturn the jury’s factual 
determination without providing the Court with sufficient 
justification to do so. 
Second, because variations almost always exist among class 
members, adopting Tyson’s standard would mean that virtually no 
class action could be certified. There is no limiting principle in Tyson’s 
standard to prevent it from requiring “classwide evidence to capture 
every minuscule variation in workers’ time.”111 In fact, the Court 
openly rejected a similarly stringent standard of proof that the Sixth 
 
 106.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011). 
 107.  Brief for the United States, supra note 22, at 20. 
 108.  See Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 797–98 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting the 
factual dissimilarity between the two cases). 
 109.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 50; see Bouaphakeo, 765 F.3d at 798–799. 
 110.  Brief for the United States, supra note 22, at 23. 
 111.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 15, at 42. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals demanded in Mt. Clemens.112 Therefore, at 
least in circumstances where an employer has clearly violated its 
statutory duty to keep proper records, the employees should be 
subject to a more lenient standard and be able to use statistical 
evidence to prove their injury. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the clear evidentiary standard laid out in Anderson v. 
Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., the Supreme Court should allow the use of 
statistical evidence as common proof satisfying class certification 
requirements, at least in cases where the employer has clearly violated 
its FLSA recordkeeping duty. Nevertheless, given its ruling in Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, the Court may be less willing to allow such 
representative evidence to prove class-wide liability and damages 
under other circumstances. The future of class actions remains grim, 
but the plaintiffs in this case should prevail. 
 
 
 112.  See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686–87 (1946) (rejecting the 
Sixth Circuit’s argument that it is insufficient for the employees to prove their case with an 
estimated average of overtime worked). 
